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Abstract
The effects of institutions on international trade relations are of theoretical and
practical interest. By following the research perspective that interprets institutions as
the “rules of the game”, I suggest and study three domestic legal institutions---tenure
system for judges, precedent law, and judicial review that supposedly have significant
effects on international trade flows. My empirical tests show that both precedent law
and judicial review have independent effects on bilateral trade volume while the
proposed independent effect of tenured judge is unsupported. Moreover, my empirical
evidences suggest that precedent law introduces its effect in a monadic fashion while
judicial review (measured as the review of legislative legitimacy) introduces its effect
in a dyadic way.
21. Instruction
The rediscovery of institutions by neo-institutionalists is probably the most
important advancement of contemporary political economy.1 The neo-institutionalism
paradigm builds on the notion that institutions regulating human interactions
ultimately affect economic outcomes by imposing transaction costs on economic
activities.2 Because rarely is transaction cost zero in the real world,3 today most
political economists agree that to understand actual, rather than potential, economic
outcomes requires institutional analysis. During the past decade, empirical efforts
made by applied economists as well as political scientists have considerably improved
our understanding of the usefulness of institutions on many academic fronts, such as
economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995; Olson 1996; Hall and Jones 1999;
Acemoglou et al. 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2002; Rodrik et al. 2004 to name a
few) and financial well-being (Beck and Levine 2004; La Porta et al. 1998, 2000,
2004a, and the central bank independence literature by a variety of authors).
It is not hard to see that the development of neo-institutionalism can also
contribute to the international trade literature because arguments concerning
institutional impacts on economic performances are readily extendable to the study of
international trade relations. Presumably, institutions can influence international trade
flows through two channels. First, institutions help enhance the efficiency of domestic
1 North (1990, 107): ‘I wish to assert a much more fundamental role for institutions in societies; they are the
underlying determinants for the long-run performance of economies.” In fact, economists' interest in institutions
could even be traced back to Montesquieu (1748) and Smith (1776). It was also granted considerable attention by
early institutionalists such as T. Veblen, J.R. Commons and W.C. Mitchell.
2 And for many neo-institutionalists, the protection of property rights plays a pivotal role in this process.
According to them, in any society where property rights are poorly protected private firms are reluctant to develop
advanced technology, engage in market exchange, and pursue economy of scale, all of which are key instruments
in promoting economic efficiency. In this situation, the poor protection of property rights raises transaction costs in
various economic activities and in consequence leads to undesirable economic outcomes.
3 This is exactly the reason for the development of Coase Theorem.
3economy. 4 Then the domestic improvement in economic efficiency makes
internationalized exchanges of productive factors and consumer goods more desirable.
Second, institutions that are directly regulating international exchanges can come into
this process by tilting transaction costs associated with such exchanges, which
constitutes a nontrivial part of international traders' profitability calculation. In short,
if institutions can determine the cost and benefit of cross-border trading activities,
they are expected to explain a huge chunk of international trade flows. In fact, recent
studies concerning unobserved costs and barriers in international trade relations have
suggested the necessity to include more institutional analysis in the field (Anderson
and Marcouiller 2000; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000; Rauch 2001; Deardorff 2001;
Anderson 2001; de Groot et al. 2004).
In this study, I am going to empirically investigate an unchartered territory
concerning the institution-trade nexus---namely, what, why, and how domestic legal
institutions determine international trade flows. For this purpose, I organize the
remainder of this article as follows. Section 2 starts with clarifying my research
perspective. Unlike many previous empirical works that treat institutions as
aggregated institutional outcomes, the current study takes the angle that thinks of
institutions as specified institutional designs and arrangements. Section 3 presents
theories that are capable of proposing why, what, and how domestic legal institutions
matter in determining international trade flows and derive testable hypotheses
accordingly. In this process, the legal-origin literature works as the “giant's shoulders”
4 The neo-institutional growth literature have provided considerable evidences for this linkage, see Hall and Jones
(1999) for an example.
4for figuring out legal institutions as a productive research domain. And research
works in a variety of academic fields such as history, politics, economics, and legal
study, will be referred to for explaining what and how domestic legal institutions
might influence international trade. Section 4 discusses my research methods, data
sources, and variable operationalizations. Empirical results are presented and
discussed in section 5. Section 6, the concluding part, summarizes the implications of
my empirical findings, clarifies the limitations of the current study, and proposes
possible directions for future researches.
2. Institutions as the “Rules of the Game”
For anyone who intends to empirically study institutional effects on economic
performances, the first question arose is how to define and hence measure institutions
in his or her research. Despite the sheer volume of the empirical literature on
institutions, the exact meaning of institutions is often ambiguous and varies from on
study to another. North (1990 p3), for example, provides the most frequently used
definition of institutions as “Humanly devised constraints that shape human
interactions”. However, the meaning of “constraints” is again ambiguous and hence
relies on the interpretation of empirical researchers. Given these, I deem that a short
deviation to clarify my position on this issue is necessary.
Conventionally, there are two major methods of empirically measuring
institutions. The first method juxtaposes institutions with aggregated institutional
outcomes. In other words, it intends to measure institutions by evaluating the overall
functional effects of innumerable and hence unspecified institutional designs. And
5data sets such as International Country Risk Guide (ICRG by Knack and Keefer
1995), Governance Matters Program (GMP by Kaufman et al. 2003) and the Polity
program (by Marshall and Jaggers 2003) are good examples of applying this method
to collect data about institutions. Despite the predominance of this method in the
empirical literature on institutions, findings based on such a research method are often
criticized for endogenous causality, practical irrelevance, and theoretical
insignificance. 5 As a result, many researchers argue that an effort to measure
institutions as specified institutional designs (the “rules of the game”) rather than the
functions of these designs is much more productive and hence desirable. For example,
Przeworski (2004 p8) argues, “Securing property rights, coordinating investment, and
rendering the rulers accountable are second-order features of complex institutional
frameworks. As such, they constitute consequences of specific institutions, such as
patterns of separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary or of central banks,
procedures for electing rulers, and the like. Hence, the first question is which specific
institutional arrangements promotes these second-order features...''.Today more and
more empirical studies of institutions begin to apply this method that treats
institutions as the “rules of the game” in their measurement of institutions.
Although evaluating the relative advantages of the above two empirical methods
of measuring institutions is of theoretical and practical importance, such a
comparative evaluation is by no means the interest of the current study. However, it is
worth to clarify at the beginning that this study founds itself on the understanding of
5 For comprehensive criticisms of this type of measurement, see Glaeser et al. (2004) and Przeworski (2004).
6institutions as specified institutional designs rather than aggregated institutional
outcomes.
3. Why Domestic Legal Institutions? What Domestic Legal Institutions? And
How they Work?
Adopting the research perspective that interprets institutions as detailed
institutional arrangements immediately raises the question of how to identify those
institutions that might have significant effects on international trade relations. It is
however a very hard question given the facts that there are innumerable
social-political institutions in the real world and efficient institutions are extremely
rare events (Eggertsson 2004). Suppose in the ideal situation, we have
supercomputers that can do light-speed calculations and all information of all
institutions have been stored in our data matrices. Then importing the data matrices
into the supercomputers and doing exploratory statistics is probably the best way to
find out those institutions that promote external trade. Nevertheless we as social
scientists can hardly expect anything even approximating to this ideal situation. Thus,
for any single article like the current one, the best thing we can do is to analyze a few
institutions and expect that our accumulative efforts can finally sort out most (if not
all) institutions considerably influencing international trade. However, even this
limited ambition requires some guidance to follow. Do we have any in hand?
Fortunately, the answer is “yes”.
If all research works are dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giant, recent
advancements in the legal-origin literature provide strong shoulders for this study. The
legal-origin literature starts with the sheer fact that all of the contemporary legal
7systems across the world evolved themselves from three western legal origins---the
Anglo-American common law, the Romano-Germanic civil law, and the socialist law.
The Anglo-American common law first developed in England and then spread to the
former British colonies throughout the world.6 The expansion of U.S. as a hegemonic
power, especially in the post-WWII era, further consolidated the global influence of
the common law. The tradition of Romano-Germanic civil law could be traced back to
Roman law. However, the substantive and procedural meanings of the contemporary
civil law were almost entirely defined by the modern efforts of two European
countries---France and Germany. The French civil law with a clear mark of Napoleon
rule was born in the Great Revolution. It was first transplanted to other countries on
the European continent7 with Napoleon “Weltgeist on horseback” and henceforth
extended globally through European colonization of the rest of the world.8 The
Germany civil law grew up with Bismarck's unification of Germany and hence its
judiciary. It was later on imitated by many countries of Middle Europe and East
Asian.9 The creation of socialist law was seeded by the 1917 Russia revolution. With
the fanfare of Red Army echoing on the European continent and the global expansion
of the socialism, socialist law became globally influential. Even after the cold war and
the collapse of Soviet Union, the socialist law kept its influence in countries such as
China, Cuba, and Vietnam.10 Through a series of empirical studies, the legal origin
6 United States, Canada, Australia, India, Malaysia and Hong Kong.
7 Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Span, and Portugal.
8 Sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, and the entire South America.
9 Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland are examples in Middle Europe. Japan is the classic example in East
Asia.
10 Despite the rhetoric hostility of socialistic jurists toward all capitalist laws, the strong connection between
socialist law and civil law is hardly deniable. This could be partially attributed to the historical tie between them,
where almost all socialist-law countries were previously under the rule of Romano-Germanic civil law and hence
8literature as a whole shows that different legal origins account for considerable
variations in cross-country economic performances such as economic growth and
financial well-being(Beck and Levine 2004, La Porta et al. 1998, 2000, 2004a to
name a few). In particular, the literature suggests that contemporary legal systems
originated in the Anglo-American common law bring about significant advantages
over those originated in the Romano-Germanic civil law and the socialist law in
promoting financial and economic development.
It is obvious, however, that legal origins as a series of dummy variables can not
theoretically explain the variations in economic performances. Instead, there must be
some causal mechanisms behind it that are functionally serving economic well-beings.
Because legal institutions are correlated with legal origins, they provide us a group of
candidates for matching this gap. In the context of international trade relations, legal
institutions seem to be reasonable candidates as well. On the one hand, legal
institutions may influence external trade by directly imposing transaction costs on it.
On the other hand, legal institutions may also usher in their effects on trade relations
indirectly. For example, efficient legal arrangements can benefit economic
productivity by protecting individual property rights that are seemingly irrelevant with
external trade. The development of domestic economy then makes internationalized
exchanges of goods and productive factors more profitable and desirable.
I argue that the preference of the political winners, who gained the control over
the formation of the modern sovereign statehood in the mother countries of
the borrowing of civil-law concepts and practices by socialist-law countries as convenience is never uncommon.
However, the more decisive reason lies in the common purpose of civil-law and socialist-law countries to
strengthen state power, a point I am going to discuss in the coming-up sections.
9contemporary legal systems, on the issue of containing state (or Crown) power is the
key to explain the varied arrangements of legal institutions in these countries. Such
variations in legal institutions later on brought about consequential, though probably
unintentional, consequences on economic activities including external trade. To make
this point clearer, a journey into the modern Western history is indispensable. The fate
of common law was decisively determined by the process of 17th century English
history that fraught with conflicts between the Crown who represents the interest of
feudal totalitarianism and the parliament that represents the interest of aristocrats and
estate holders. After a series of wars and dethrones, the parliament finally defeated the
kings and gained the political control of the country including the power to shape the
judiciary. As the final winner of the prolonged bloodshed, the parliament had the
obvious incentive to perpetuate its dominance by containing Crown power. And
institutional designs of the new judiciary provided viable means for doing so. United
States, as another important exporter of the common law, also had a “pro-control”
stance on the issue of containing state (Crown) power. Due to their early experiences
under the British colonial rule, the establishers of the new country was fully aware of
state’s potential to abuse its power and hence intended to build a political system on
the basis of balanced power, in which the court would be empowered to the extant
that it is capable of checking state power. The modern civil law was vitalized under
the direct wish of great men---Napoleon and Bismarck as their instrument to serve the
interest of a newly rising capitalistic class crying for nationalism and modern
sovereign statehood. In the shadow of feudalistic resurgence, domestic turmoil, and
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foreign militarized intervention, both Napoleon and Bismarck chose to strengthen the
state (Crown) power in defending the new sovereign statehood. Finally, the creation
of socialist law was arguably seeded by the 1917 Russian revolution that gives birth to
the first socialist state in history. Like other survivors of bloody political fight, the
Bolshevik party was desperate to consolidate its political dominance by strengthening
the state power. This effort was further reinforced by the socialistic ideology that
glorifies the socialist state as the embodiment of the wishes of the people to which all
individuals and political branches including the judiciary should be subordinate.
To make court an effective instrument in containing state (or Crown) power, the
endowment of three political functions to the court seems necessary. First, the court
must be organizationally independent from state (or Crown) control. Second, the court
should have its own channel through which its influence on social-political activities
could be introduced. Finally, besides directly influencing state life, the court needs
necessary means to restrain the political discretion of state (or Crown) that is intended
to circumvent its checks and balances. I argue that these three functions that are
conducive to the containment of state (or Crown) power has been historically
transformed into three legal institutions---tenure system for judges, precedent law, and
judicial review, which clearly vary over different legal traditions. Over time,
cross-national variations in the three legal institutions have introduced considerable,




Both early political theorists and contemporary empirical scholars recognize the
importance of life-time appointments for guaranteeing judicial independence.
Alexander Hamilton for example argues, “nothing can contribute so much to the
judiciary's firmness and independence as permanency in office” (federalist papers,
no.78). Contemporary empirical studies on American courts and bureaucracy also
provide considerable evidences for this stance. For example, the literature of
American supreme court shows no systematic evidences for either presidential or
congressional influence over the decisions made by supreme court judges who have
life-time tenure; while Gordan and Huber (2004) find that without tenure position,
American judges of local criminal courts behave strategically when reelection is
approaching, which inevitably degrades their impartiality.
Historically, life-time appointments of judges in common-law systems could be
traced back to the 1701 Act of settlement between the English king and the parliament
(Dawson 1968; Hayek 1960). After that judges sitting on the royal common-law court
can only be removed by the common decisions made by the two Houses of the
parliament instead of the wish of the Crown. Such an arrangement was clearly due to
the parliament's victory in the conflict over state control and its attempt to
permanently smother the king's influence on the common-law court through his
arbitrarily patronizing the Crown's followers and dismissing the Crown's dissents. The
tenured judge of common-law court was then carried to many corners of the world
with British overseas colonization. Despite the popularity of granting judges
permanent positions in common-law judiciary, this institution is largely alien to most
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countries that have either a civil or a socialist legal origins. In fact judges of the
Soviet Russia and many people's republics are regularly elected namely for the sake
of “people's democracy”. Such a difference is by no means surprising given the varied
preference of political winners in the mother countries of contemporary legal systems
on the issue of limiting state (Crown) power. The English parliament intended to
contain the Crown power and hence granted the tenure privilege to its political
ally---the common-law judges. Napoleon, Bismarck, and Bolshevik party alike were
determined to defend their new sovereign states by strengthening state power.
Granting judges a rigid position within the power structure is obviously contradictory
to their purpose.
As we noted before, granting permanent positions for judges indisputably
promotes the judicial independence. And an independent judiciary can presumably
facilitate a better protection of property rights in terms of providing a credible
commitment to dissuade the arbitrary use of power by the sovereign whether it is the
king or the parliament itself (North and Weingast 1989). The safety of individual
property rights might then influence international trade both directly and indirectly.
On the one hand, judicial independence can promote international trade directly.
When one party in a trading dispute is politically more powerful than the other (for
instance, a dispute between a state-owned or state-affiliated company v.s. a private
firm), a judicial system that is largely immune from political influence is invaluable
for the protection of individual property rights. In this case, the better protection of
individual property rights decreases the transaction costs associated with political
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uncertainty and hence encourages the cross-border trading activities. On the other
hand, independent judiciary helps promote international trade indirectly. The secured
property rights in domestic economic activities such as public and private loans can
promote the overall economic efficiency. Although such domestic economic activities
are seemingly unrelated with international trade, the improved economic efficiency
driven by them will ultimately make external trade more profitable and hence increase
the trade volume.
In the context of bilateral trade flows, domestic legal institutions may introduce
their effects in three distinct dynamics---commonality effect, dyadic effect, and
monadic effect. And there are both theoretical and practical reasons for why we need
to empirically differentiate these three dynamics. First, it is important to differentiate
the effect of commonality from both a dyadic effect and a monadic effect because a
significant effect of commonality is indeed a rejection of the causal mechanisms
suggested in my theoretical reasoning. In other words, a significant effect of
commonality shows that as long as the trading partners share the same institutional
arrangements in their legal systems, such a similarity decreases the transaction cost
and hence stimulates trading activities. Therefore, cross-national variations in
domestic legal institutions themselves do not have any independent effect on bilateral
trade flows. Second, it is important to differentiate between a dyadic effect from a
monadic effect of domestic legal institutions on bilateral trade. A dyadic effect means
that the effects of one country's legal institutions on its external trade are conditioned
on its trading partner's domestic legal institutions. In contrast, a monadic effect rejects
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such a conditionality and assumes that one country's legal institutions can introduce
their effects unilaterally. Obviously, the difference between a dyadic effect and a
monadic effect defines the effectiveness of any unilateral legal reform intending to
promote foreign trade.
Given all these, I test the three distinct dynamics for each domestic legal
institution that I am proposing. The similarity effect of tenure system for judges is
summarized in hypothesis 1(a). Because my theory about legal institutions rejects the
existence of commonality, an insignificance test result is expected if my theory is
correct. Furthermore, because my theory can not differentiate between the potential
dyadic effect and monadic effect of domestic legal institutions, I treat this as an
empirical question and derive corresponding hypotheses. And the potential dyadic and
monadic effects of tenured judges are summarized in hypothesis 1(b) and hypothesis
1(c).
Hypothesis 1(a) Commonality Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
tenure positions for judges or neither of them adopt it in their legal systems, a higher
level of bilateral trade should be observed.
Hypothesis 1(b) Dyadic Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt tenure
positions for judges in their legal systems, a higher level of bilateral trade should be
observed.
Hypothesis 1(c) Monadic Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
tenure positions for judges in their legal systems, their bilateral trade level should be
higher than that in the situation where only one side adopts it. The bilateral trade
15
level in the situation where only one side adopts tenure positions for judges is in turn
higher than that of the situation where neither sides adopt it.
(b) Precedent Law
To work as a functional instrument in containing state (or Crown) power, the
court needs its own channel to introduce political influence. I argue that the practice
of precedent law characterizing the Anglo-American common law is an important
institutional arrangement for realizing this end. In a common-law country, judges are
allowed and sometimes even encouraged to make laws in terms of establishing
precedents on the basis of their logic reasoning and legal interpretation. This practice
of empowering previous judge-made decisions binding effects on later similar cases,
known as the doctrine of stare decisis, provides common-law court a considerable
discretion to engrave its own political wishes on the society. Countries with civil or
socialist legal traditions on the contrary block this channel by rejecting the idea of
judge-made law and adopting legislative codification. Such a discrepancy in their
judicial arrangements is quite understandable because the mother countries of
contemporary civil and socialist laws intended to strengthen the state (or Crown)
power in the process of forming their modern sovereign statehood.
As a source of law, the codified statute law originates in Roman law of the sixth
century A.D. under the Emperor Justinian (Ehrmann 1976). However, it was the
French Revolution resuscitated this archaic method in the modern practice of civil law
(Merryman 1985, 1996). The fights between French kings and the revolutionists that
climaxed in the Revolution and extended through Napoleon rule could be viewed as
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conflict between the aristocratic class that benefiting from feudal secession and the
rising capitalistic class crying for nationalism and modern sovereign state. The leaders
of French revolution once controlled the country, began to form all political
institutions in response to the demand of the capitalistic class. The notorious
Bourbonian judges11 who benefited from and served for the feudal secession now
become the targets of revolutionists who intends, in Robespierre's rhetoric, to efface
the word jurisprudence from French language (Dawson 1968, p387). For the purpose
of strengthening state power, the archaic practice of statute law was now resuscitated
in replacing the judge-made law. And it is indisputably Napoleon who brought this
effort to a new pinnacle with the 1804 Code Napoleon shining on the top. As a
fundamentalist of legal positivism, Napoleon looked for a code that is crafted so
seamlessly that there is no chance of encountering the shoddy of statutes and no need
for any learned effort in interpreting the meaning of its provisions. As a result, the role
of post-revolution judges became highly mechanical---summarize the legal facts and
find the according provision(s) in the Code. For the same token of strengthening state
power, both Bismarck and the Bolshevik party following the steps of Napoleon denied
the legitimacy of judge-made law in their judicial systems and used codified statute
law instead. Intending to contain Crown power, English parliament on the contrary
strengthened the royal common-law court that adjudicated cases primarily on the
basis of judge-made law, on the expense of king's prerogative court (the famous Star
Chamber) and the court of chancery, both of which ruled cases without the practice of
11 The sales of judgeships should be especially blamed for the deterioration of judicial reputation.
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case law (David and Brierley 1968; North and Weingast 1989).
A literature of comparative legal study that starts with Posner (1973) explored the
positive effect of precedent law on economic efficiency. It argues that inefficient laws
are more likely to be challenged in courts than efficient laws because they impose
more transaction costs on the society. As long as previous judicial decisions have
binding effects on later cases, litigants who are interested in the establishment of
efficient precedents will repeatedly litigate until their demands are satisfied. Through
this process, efficient laws replace inefficient laws and finally prevail in a
common-law society. The dominance of efficient laws then reduces the overall
transaction cots and helps the economy of a common-law society converge to its
optimal (Rubin 1977; Priest 1977). The rejection of judge-made law makes civil-law
and socialist-law societies unable to count on the judiciary to correct inefficient
laws. 12 Instead, they have to primarily rely on the legislative process that is
considerably slothful, costly, and inefficient (Bailey and Rubin 1994). However, the
situation could be even more serious when it is the legislative body itself that is
promulgating inefficient laws for some reasons.13 As before, I argue that the adoption
of precedent law can influence international trade both directly and indirectly. On the
one hand, through repeated litigation efficient laws replace inefficient laws in
regulating trading activities. The prevalence of efficient trading laws hence directly
reduces the transaction costs of external trade. On the other hand, efficient solutions
12 Even if all laws in a legal system are efficient at the beginning, some of them may no longer be so as
social-economic or technological conditions change.
13 For instance, the legislative body is captured by certain interest groups that benefit from socially inefficient
statutes.
18
of domestic economic disputes promote the overall efficiency of domestic economy.
Such a promotion in turn encourages external trading activities by increasing the
benefits of internationalized exchanges. Given all these, I propose the second group of
hypotheses as follows.
Hypothesis 2(a) Commonality Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
precedent law or neither of them adopt it in their legal systems, a higher level of
bilateral trade should be observed.
Hypothesis 2(b) Dyadic Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
precedent law in their legal systems, a higher level of bilateral trade should be
observed.
Hypothesis 2(c) Monadic Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
precedent law in their legal systems, their bilateral trade level should be higher than
that in the situation where only one side adopts it. The bilateral trade level in the
situation where only one side adopts precedent law is in turn higher than that of the
situation where neither sides adopt it.
(c) Judicial Review
Besides seeking to organizationally control judges or intrusively block the court's
channel of introducing political influence, the state (or Crown) may also try to
paralyze the independent function of judiciary by circumventing its checks and
balances. For instance, the executive order widely adopted by modern states may
serve for this purpose. For another, after the dethrones of kings the legislative body in
many countries become the new master. The legislative body, just like their royal
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predecessors, now may be attracted to abuse its power in terms of passing bills that
are intruding individual property rights. In that case, the previous feudal autocracy of
the Crown was simply replaced by a functionally equivalent legislative tyranny.
Therefore, for a successful containment of the sovereign power, courts must have
effective means to check the political discretion of the sovereign. And judicial review,
a power given to judiciary to check the behaviors of the state against constitution, is
designed for this end.
The formal establishment of judicial review as a legal institution should be
credited to the eighteenth-century United States. Following the Marbury v.s. Madison
decision, the U.S. supreme court was recognized the power to check the legitimacy of
both legislative bills and executive actions against the constitution---a clear extension
of the continued efforts to contain state power. The institutional arrangement of
judicial review however is foreign to the civil and the socialist laws because the
political winners in their mother countries have the uttermost interest to consolidate
state power. And granting the power of constitutional review to judiciary is indeed
nothing but the introduction of a veto player in their power structures. Keeping this in
mind, it is not hard to understand why the civil-law and socialist-law countries
commonly deny the power of constitutional review to their courts. As a result, the
constitutions of socialist countries are never practically involved in judicial decisions
and the power of constitutional review in France is given to the Constitutional
Council whose constitutes and operational procedures demonstrate its nature as a
subsystem of the executive branch rather than that of the judiciary (David and
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Brierley 1968; Ehrmann 1976).
Since judicial review can be used to check the abuse of power by both the
executive and the legislative bodies, it provides an important instrument for
individuals, private firms, as well as other organizations to protect their property
rights from the threat of state intrusion. Following the same logic I have used in
explaining the effect of tenured judges on external trade, I suggest that the better
protection of property rights due to the adoption of judicial review can encourage
external trading activities both directly and indirectly. And such effects should be
reflected and hence observed in bilateral trade volume. As before, I propose
hypotheses for the potential commonality effect, dyadic effect, and monadic effect
accordingly.
Hypothesis 3(a) Commonality Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
judicial review or neither of them adopt it in their legal systems, a higher level of
bilateral trade should be observed.
Hypothesis 3(b) Dyadic Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
judicial review in their legal systems, a higher level of bilateral trade should be
observed.
Hypothesis 3(c) Monadic Effect: When both sides within a trading dyad adopt
judicial review in their legal systems, their bilateral trade level should be higher than
that in the situation where only one side adopts it. The bilateral trade level in the
situation where only one side adopt constitutional review is in turn higher than that of
the situation where neither sides adopt it.
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Through the above analysis, I intended to theoretically answer why legal
institutions, what legal institutions, and how legal institutions matter in influencing
international trade. With the guidance of the legal-origin literature, I specify domestic
legal institutions as a domain that is likely to provide efficient institutions contributing
to international trade. And my theoretical analysis plus historical evidences show what
domestic legal institutions matter and how they matter. Historically, mother countries
of contemporary legal systems due to the preference of their domestic political
winners, had different positions concerning the containment of state (Crown) power in
shaping their modern sovereign statehood. Mother countries of the contemporary
common law (England and U.S.) intended to contain the state (Crown) power while
mother countries of both civil (France and Germany) and socialist (Soviet Russia)
laws are inclined to advance the state (Crown) power. As a result, legal arrangements
that facilitate the containment of state (Crown) power flourished in mother countries
of contemporary common-law systems while such legal arrangements were paralyzed
in the mother countries of contemporary civil and socialist laws. Over time, these
legal institutions were transplanted throughout the world with both militarized
conquests and active imitations. Due to the variations in legal institutions, courts in
common-law countries are more capable of checking the sovereign power whether it
is a king, a dictator, or a legislative body, while courts in civil-law and socialist-law
countries become subordinate to the sovereign. The variations in legal institutions
hence introduce consequential effects on various economic activities that are directly
or indirectly related with the cost and benefit of external trade. It turns out that
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institutions originally designed for limiting the state (or Crown) power in the
formation of modern sovereigns has unintentionally encouraged international trading
activities, which should be reflected in bilateral trade volumes.
4. Methods, Data, and Variable Operationalizations
(a) Gravity Model
In order to identify the effects of domestic legal institutions on bilateral trade
flows, I estimate a gravity model.14 The basic version of gravity model explains the
logged aggregated trade volume between any two countries by three factors---the
logged product of their populations, the logged product of their GDPs, and the logged
distance between them.15
Ln(Trade)=Ln(GDP1*GDP2)+Ln(POP1*POP2)+Ln(Distance)+e [equation 1]
For my research purpose, I estimate my gravity model as follows.
Ln(Trade)=Ln(GDP1*GDP2})+Ln(POP1*POP2)+Ln(Distance)+xb+e [equation 2]
Where x is the data matrix indexing my covariates other than GDP, population,
and distance; b is the coefficient vector for these covariates; and e is the error term.
(b) Sample, Variables, and Operationalizations
My research sample contains non-directed trading dyads of 70 countries in 1995.
The variables of the basic gravity model---logged bilateral trade volume, logged
product of GDPs, logged product of populations, and logged distance are derived
from Rose (2004). According to the literature of gravity model, three general
14 During the past three decades, various theoretical justifications for this model have been offered (Anderson
1979; Helpman and Krugman 1985; Deardorff 1998) and the model has been practically doing well.
15 Population is included in the gravity model as a proxy for a country's market size; GDP here is the measurement
of state's capacity to support export and to demand import; and distance is included as a proxy for transportation
costs.
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predictions could be made concerning the basic gravity effects of bilateral trade. First,
the larger a country's GDP, the more likely it can sell and buy more internationally.
Second, the greater is each state's population, the less they trade because trading takes
the domestic form. Finally, the farther apart two states, the more transportation costs
are imposed and hence the less their trade with each other. In short, the logged
bilateral trade flows are expected to be positively related to the logged product of
GDPs and negatively related to both the logged product of populations and the logged
distance. And empirical findings that are inconsistent with these predictions are
usually seen as indicates of model misspecification.
The measures of my principal variables---tenure system for judges, precedent law,
and judicial review, are derived from La Porta et al.(2004b). The variable of tenured
judge measures whether a country provides lifetime positions for its judges. The
variable of precedent law measures whether previous court decisions are allowed to
have binding effects on later courts' rulings. The variable of judicial review measures
whether courts are empowered to review laws against a constitution or constitutional
documents. It is worth noting however that this measure of judicial review is not
satisfactory---it is a little different from the concept of judicial review in my theory,
which requires the reviewed subject includes both rules (usually bills passed by a
legislative body) and actions(usually executive orders and administrative actions
delivered by bureaucratic agencies). Given the overwhelm of executive orders and
bureaucratic actions in regulating modern societies, such a limitation on data quality
may have considerable influences on empirical results. So we should keep this issue
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in mind when interpreting findings about this variable.
In order to differentiate the potential commonality effect, dyadic effect, and
monadic effect of domestic legal institutions, I first construct a commonality-effect
variable for each legal institution. When the legal institutions on each side of a trading
dyad match, that is when both sides adopt certain institutional design or neither sides
adopt it, the value of 1 is given. Otherwise, the value of 0 is given. Following this rule,
three dummy variables---matched tenure, matched precedent law, and matched review
are constructed. Second, I construct a series of dummy variables for each legal
institution---(1) both tenure, both precedent law, and both review measure whether
both sides within a trading dyad have the same legal institutional design of tenured
judge, precedent law, and judicial review; (2) one tenure, one precedent law, and one
review measure whether only one side within a dyad has tenured judges, precedent
law, and judicial review in its legal system; (3) neither tenure, neither precedent law,
and neither review measure whether none of the two sides within a dyad have tenured
judges, precedent law, and judicial review in their legal systems.
I also include another five variables as control. They are common colony ever,
common colony after 1945, common language, common regional trade agreement
(RTA), and common currency union, which measures whether the two sides within a
trading dyad were ever under the same colonial rule in history, were under the same
colonial rule after the WWII, had the same language, were in the same regional trade
agreement (RTA), and were in the same currency union in 1995. Since all of these
control variables work as proxies of decreased transaction costs for trade, they are
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expected to be positively related with bilateral trade volume. The five control
variables are again derived from the Rose data set (2004).
5. Empirical Results
In order to differentiate the potential commonality effect, dyadic effect, and
monadic effect of domestic legal institutions, I run the following regressions with
ordinary least square (OLS) estimation. I first run the basic gravity model by
regressing logged bilateral trade volume on logged product of GDPs, logged product
of populations, and logged distance. Second, I examine the potential commonality
effect by adding the three dummies variables---matched tenure, matched precedent
law, and matched review to the basic gravity model. Third, I evaluate the potential
dyadic effect of domestic legal institutions by using another three dummies---both
tenure, both precedent law, and both review. Finally, to test the potential monadic
effect of legal institutions, I include another six dummies variables---one tenure, one
precedent law, one review, neither tenure, neither precedent law, and neither review
to the previous model testing dyadic effect. Since the three groups of
dummies---“both”, “one”, and “neither” are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive,
I constrain this model to drop the dummies starts with “neither”. In other words, I am
choosing neither tenure, neither precedent law, and neither review as the benchmark
lines for comparison.
[Table.1 here]
Table.1 reports the basic findings concerning the effects of domestic legal institutions
on bilateral trade flow. A quick inspection of the three basic gravity factors shows that
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my gravity model with OLS estimation behaves well. The logged product of GDPs is
positively related with the logged bilateral trade volume while the logged product of
populations and the logged distance are negatively related with it. Obviously, all of
these are consistent with economic theories. The empirical tests for differentiating
commonality effect, dyadic effect, and monadic effect yield some interesting results.
First, the estimates of a dyadic model shows that tenure system for judges, precedent
law, and judicial review all have significant effects on bilateral trade flow. However,
combined with the information provided by the test of commonality effect and the test
of monadic effect, we can see it is imprudent to claim that all these three variables
really introduce their effects in a dyadic fashion. First, although tenure system for
judges have a significant effect in the dyadic model, it also turns out to be significant
in the test of commonality effect, which is reflected by the variable of matched tenure
with a p-value smaller than 0.01. Therefore, it is likely to be the case that when
neither sides adopt tenured judges in their legal systems, their bilateral trade is the
same as (or even better than) that of the situation where both sides adopt such an
institutional arrangement. And the estimates of dyadic model provide another piece of
information that confirms this speculation. Compared with the situation where neither
sides adopt tenured judges, the appearance of tenured judges on only one side of the
trading dyad proves to be significantly worse for the promotion of bilateral trade
(reflected in the coefficient of -0.37),16 while the variable of both tenure does not
16 The variable of one tenure is indeed the “non-matched” category in the model of commonality effect. However,
the testing result is not the exact opposite because in the test of monadic effect, the previous matched tenure has
been split into two categories---both tenure and neither tenure, and the neither tenure has been chosen as the
benchmark.
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make any significant effect. Given all these, the institutional design of providing
judges lifetime positions seems to introduce an effect of commonality. However, as I
have discussed before, such an effect is indeed a rejection of my proposition that
tenure system for judges has its independent effect on bilateral trade.
Second, both precedent law and judicial review are highly significant in the test
of dyadic effect while highly insignificant in the test of commonality effect. Such
results rule out the possibility of commonality effect and hence confirms the existence
of independent effects introduced by these legal institutions. However, the test for
monadic effect shows some more delicate dynamics. Compared with the situation
where neither sides adopt precedent in their court ruling, the adoption of precedent
law on only one side significantly promotes the bilateral trade volume, which is
shown by the coefficient of 0.41. Furthermore, the adoption of precedent law on both
sides within a trading dyad also significantly increases the bilateral trade volume with
a scale shown by the coefficient of 0.68 in comparison to the situation where neither
sides adopt it. The considerable difference between 0.68 and 0.41, therefore, suggests
that precedent law, as a legal institutional design, introduces its effect on bilateral
trade flow in a monadic fashion. In the same model, the test result of judicial review,
however, suggests a quite different dynamic. Although there is a huge difference in
the effect magnitude between both review and one review (0.51 v.s. 0.046), only the
coefficient for both review is statistically significant. That is, compared with the
situation where neither sides adopt judicial review in their legal systems, only a
switch to the situation in which both sides adopt judicial review can significantly
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promote the bilateral trade volume. In other words, judicial review introduces a
dyadic effect on bilateral trade. This is obviously a confirmation for a similar finding
in the early test of dyadic effect.
Findings in Table.1 suggest that tenure system for judges, case law, and judicial
review influence bilateral trade flow through three different dynamics---namely
commonality effect, monadic effect, and dyadic effect. In order to check the
robustness of such findings, I include five control variables---common colony ever,
common colony post 1945, common language, common currency union, and common
regional trade agreement (RTA), and report the empirical results in Table. 2.
[Table.2 here]
First of all, GDP, population, and distance together explain a huge chunk of
bilateral trade flow with statistical significance in the predicted directions, which is
again a proof of the validity of my modeling. Second, all my findings reported in
Table. 1 holds. The proposed independent effect of lifetime position for judges is
again rejected due to the significant test result of commonality effect. Both precedent
law and judicial review show their robust independent effect on bilateral trade though
they introduce their effects in two distinct dynamics. The adoption of precedent law
introduces a monadic effect on trade while judicial review influences trade in a dyadic
fashion. Finally, all the five control variables display apparent positive effects on
bilateral trade. However, only three of them---common language, common colony in
history, and common colony after 1945 are statistically significant. The insignificant
effects of currency union and RTA are consistent with both Rose's empirical works
29
that questions the usefulness of international economic arrangements in promoting
international trade and Eggertsson's argument (2004) that efficient institutions are
extremely rare events when we treat institutions as specified designs or arrangements.
6. Concluding Remarks: Interpretations, Limitations, and Future Researches
In this research, I proposed and studied three legal institutions that presumably
have significant effects on bilateral trade volume. And my empirical results show that
they are indeed introducing their effects through three distinct dynamics. Here, I am
going to highlight four points for interpreting my empirical findings. First, providing
lifetime appointment for judges has proven to introduce no independent effect on
external trade. The reason for that may lies in the difference between judicial
independence and judicial accountability. Although lifetime positions help judges to
be independent from the control of the state (Crown), judicial independence itself
does not guarantee judges to behave in an accountable way. In fact, political
independence also provides the chance to abuse power, which is a quite common
phenomenon of political economy.17 Therefore, besides focusing on the institutional
designs that guarantee the judicial independence, we probably need pay more
attention to those institutions that are conducive to the accountability of judges in our
course of searching for efficient legal institutions.
Second, precedent law has been shown to have monadic effect on trade, which
means a country can stimulate its bilateral trade volumes though unilateral reform on
this institution. This is indeed an important finding that have considerable policy
17 For example, an independent central bank is traditionally believed to be conductive to the realization of
long-term monetary goals. Recent studies however have just shown the opposite---independent from political
controls, central banks are more likely to pursue their own interests rather than that of the public (Mishkin 2003).
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implications. Here I use one recent reform effort in China's legal system to show the
policy value of this finding. In the late 1990's, China took a series of significant
reforms in its legal system, which were largely in response to the demand of
protecting foreign trade and investment. And one of these reform efforts was to
introduce certain common law principles into China's socialist legal system. Although
the idea of stare decisis has yet been fully embraced in China, the People's Supreme
Court began to issue, on a yearly basis, “judicature explanations” based on its
newly-ruled cases. And the explanations did have binding effect on local court
judgements when either shoddy of law, conflict of laws, or uncertainties about article
interpretation exists. As most other reform efforts, this reform in judicial system is far
from uncontroversial. Therefore, a scientific policy evaluation is of great importance.
According to my findings in the current study, the adoption of precedent law not only
has an independent and positive effect on external trade but also introduces such an
effect in a monadic way. Therefore, China's attempt to adopt precedent law
domestically will probably benefit its external trade, the powerhouse of its economic
development.
Third, I hope to make a point for how to interpret my finding about the effect of
judicial review. This study shows that judicial review influences bilateral trade
volume through a dyadic effect. However, it is worth noting that the measurement in
use only includes the review of legislative legitimacy. Since the theory I am proposing
refer the review subject to both bills passed by a legislative body and administrative
actions delivered by bureaucratic agencies, we should be cautious in interpreting this
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finding of dyadic effect. Presumably, there are two ways to do so. The first is to add a
precondition to our claim---as long as there is no systematic difference between
judicial review of legislative legitimacy and that of administrative actions, we can say
that judicial review has an independent and dyadic effect on external trade. Or we can
simply constrain the domain of our claim---judicial review of legislative legitimacy
has an independent and dyadic effect on external trade.
Finally, I want to briefly discuss an unsatisfactory facet of the current reach,
which at the same time suggests an interesting topic for future academic inquiries.
Although the current study figures out that precedent law and judicial review (at least
measured as the review of legislative legitimacy) do have monadic and dyadic effects
on bilateral trade, it can not tell why they follow these observational rules. Therefore,
future theoretical works that intend to explain the causal mechanisms for the monadic
effect of precedent law and the dyadic effect of judicial review are of great
importance.
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